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On Moral Arguments Against 
Recreational Drug Use 
Rob Lovering considers some of the arguments, and what they amount to. 
December 5, 2015, marked the eighty-second anniversary of the United States’ repeal of 
the National Prohibition Act, an erstwhile constitutional ban on ‘intoxicating beverages’. The 
Act’s repeal did not bring an end in the U.S. to the legal prohibition of every intoxicating 
substance, of course – the recreational use of cocaine, heroin, ecstasy, and many other 
intoxicating substances remains illegal; but it did reinstate alcohol as one of many 
intoxicating substances – of many drugs, lest there be any confusion – that Americans are 
legally permitted to use recreationally. The list also includes caffeine and nicotine. 
One might wonder why all countries currently legally permit the recreational use of some 
drugs, such as caffeine, nicotine, and (usually) alcohol, but prohibit the recreational use of 
others, such as cocaine, heroin, ecstasy and (usually) marijuana. The answer lies not simply 
in the harm the use of these drugs might cause, but in the perceived immorality of their 
use. As former U.S. Drug Czar William Bennett once put it, “I find no merit in the legalizers’ 
case. The simple fact is that drug use is wrong. And the moral argument, in the end, is the 
most compelling argument” (Drugs: Should We Legalize, Decriminalize or Deregulate?, ed. 
Jeffrey A. Schaler, 1998, p.65). Yet, despite strong rhetoric from the prohibitionists, it is 
surprisingly difficult to discern their reasons for believing that the recreational use of certain 
drugs is morally wrong. Most of the time, no reasons are even provided: it is simply 
declared, à la Bennett, that using some drugs recreationally is morally impermissible. 
This is not to say that there are no reasons for believing that using some drugs 
recreationally is wrong. Indeed, there is a wide array of arguments for the immorality of 
certain recreational drug use, ranging from the philosophically rudimentary to the 
philosophically sophisticated. But the vast majority of these arguments are unsuccessful, 
and those that succeed are quite limited in scope. 
 
Some Rudimentary Arguments 
Take, for example, one of the philosophically rudimentary arguments: Recreational drug use 
is generally unhealthy for the user; therefore, recreational drug use is wrong. 
Now it is true that recreational drug use is generally unhealthy for the user in one respect or 
another, to one degree or another. Just how unhealthy it is for the user depends not only on 
which drug, but on the amount and frequency of its use, the manner in which it is 
administered, the health of the person using it, and more. In any case, there is little 
question that recreational drug use is generally unhealthy for the user. 
But does it follow then that recreational drug use is wrong? It does if the mere fact that an 
activity is generally unhealthy – or, more broadly, generally harmful – to the one who 
engages in it renders that activity morally wrong. However, this idea is very difficult to 
justify. Indeed, there seem to be conditions under which harming oneself, even damaging 
one’s health, does not involve wrongdoing, such as when the harm is done with one’s 
voluntary, informed consent. From boxing to BASE jumping, playing contact sports to mixed 
martial arts, snowboarding to bull-riding – each of these activities can be and often is 
unhealthy to the individuals who engage in them; but none of them seem to be thereby 
morally wrong when those engaging in them do so with their voluntary, informed consent. 
Imprudent, perhaps, but not immoral. Or consider people who eat unhealthy food and 
refuse to exercise. Their voluntary and informed eating of unhealthy food and refusing to 
exercise does not seem to be morally wrong in and of itself. 
Here’s another philosophically rudimentary argument: Recreational drug use is unnatural; 
therefore, recreational drug use is wrong. 
Now there are at least seven different meanings of ‘unnatural’ that one may employ in this 
argument: statistically abnormal or unusual; not practiced by nonhuman animals; does not 
proceed from an innate desire; violates an organ’s principal purpose; gross or disgusting; 
artificial; and contrary to divine intention. But regardless of which meaning is employed, 
this argument is also unsuccessful. 
Consider just one meaning of ‘unnatural’: ‘artificial’. What’s typically meant by the claim 
that recreational drug use is artificial is that it involves inducing mental states that would 
not have occurred were it not for human intervention or contrivance. But what’s wrong with 
artificially inducing mental states? This is precisely what individuals taking medication for 
depression or bipolar disorder do; yet hardly anyone believes that taking medication for 
depression or bipolar disorder is wrong. Granted, artificially inducing mental states for 
depression or bipolar disorder differs from artificially inducing mental states for recreational 
purposes in a particular and perhaps morally significant way: the former use is medical in 
nature while the latter is not. But if the claim, as here, is simply that it is wrong to 
artificially induce mental states, then why the mental states are artificially induced makes 
no difference to the argument. Furthermore, even if the reason the mental states are 
artificially induced were relevant to the argument, this would not necessarily entail that 
artificially inducing mental states for recreational purposes renders doing so wrong. Indeed, 
we have good reasons to think that artificially inducing mental states for recreational 
purposes is morally permissible in some cases: by way of listening to music or reading a 
novel, for instance. Both the music and the novel are products of human contrivance. To 
that extent, the mental states induced by listening to music or reading a novel are induced 
artificially. Nevertheless, there seems to be nothing immoral about artificially inducing 
mental states by doing either of these things. 
There are many other philosophically rudimentary arguments: one grounds the supposed 
wrongness of recreational drug use in the claim that it squanders the user’s talents; another 
in the claim that the pleasure of recreational drug use is unearned, and so on – but let this 
suffice for now. Equivalent analogies can be cited to show why these other arguments don’t 
work either. 
 
More Sophisticated Arguments 
More philosophically sophisticated arguments for the moral wrongness of certain 
recreational drug use fare no better. Consider the following argument: By using drugs 
recreationally, the user instrumentalizes himself; therefore, recreational drug use is wrong. 
To instrumentalize oneself is to use oneself for a purpose to which one, as a rational moral 
agent, cannot in principle agree. (A rational moral agent is someone who can think in terms 
of moral reasons and act on that basis.) Most simply put, to instrumentalize oneself is to 
agree to behavior to which one could not rationally assent. For instance, if Joe necessarily 
desires x, then Joe cannot rationally agree to behavior that thwarts x, since doing so would 
involve contradicting himself – for were Joe to assent to behavior that thwarts that which he 
necessarily desires, Joe would be at once desiring both xand not-x. 
So, does recreational drug use involve using oneself for a purpose to which one cannot in 
principle agree? That depends on what the purpose of recreational drug use is. This, in turn, 
depends partly on the drug in question. For the sake of space, let us consider the 
recreational use of just one drug: marijuana. 
Typically, the purpose of using marijuana recreationally is to get high. The question, then, is 
whether the marijuana user can in principle rationally agree to the end of getting high. At 
first glance, it appears she can – the individual agreeing to get high does not on the face of 
things seem to be contradicting herself in doing so. But to be sure about this, we need to 
determine whether a pot smoker necessarily desires something that getting high thwarts. 
Although lots of things might be proposed here, but again for the sake of space, I will 
consider just one: Perhaps as a rational moral agent, the pot smoker necessarily desires all 
that is required for the preservation and exercise of rational moral agency. And it may be 
that not being high – in a word, sobriety – is required for the preservation and exercise of 
rational moral agency. Two questions now arise: do rational moral agents necessarily desire 
all that is required for the preservation and exercise of rational moral agency? And, is 
sobriety required for the preservation and exercise of rational moral agency? 
Properly addressing the first question would involve a lengthy digression into the nature of 
rational moral agency. Instead, I will simply assume that rational moral 
agents do necessarily desire all that is required for the preservation and exercise of rational 
moral agency. 
This brings us to the second question: Is sobriety required for the preservation and exercise 
of rational moral agency? Arguably not. To be sure, sobriety may be required for 
the optimal exercise of rational moral agency, but it is not required for the exercise, much 
less the preservation, of rational moral agency. The high individual can and typically does 
think in terms of moral reasons and act on that basis. As Jeffrey Reiman writes, “Even drug-
beclouded individuals know the difference between right and wrong and can understand 
when they are hurting others and so on” (Critical Moral Liberalism: Theory & Practice, 1997, 
p.89). 
Getting high, then, does not necessarily thwart all that is required for the preservation and 
exercise of rational moral agency. Accordingly, the marijuana user can indeed agree in 
principle to the end of getting high, even given that she necessarily desires all that is 
required for the preservation and exercise of rational moral agency. Substitute alcohol, 
cocaine, heroin, or ecstasy for marijuana here, and similar arguments may be proffered for 
the view that users of these drugs can also agree in principle to the end of these drugs’ 
intoxicating effects – at least up to the point of the incapacity of rational thought. 
Another philosophically sophisticated argument for the wrongness of recreational drug use is 
worth mentioning, given its popularity: By using drugs recreationally, the user may become 
addicted and thereby diminish his autonomy; therefore, recreational drug use is wrong. 
Perhaps the most important word in this argument is ‘autonomy’. And although there are 
many definitions of this word, for present purposes we will use ‘the capacity to govern 
oneself’. 
It is clear that, generally speaking, recreational drug users may become addicted to their 
drug of choice. Indeed, in Drug Legalization: For and Against (eds. Rod L. Evans and Irwin 
M. Berent, 1994), psychiatrist Michael Gazzaniga estimates that there is a ten per cent 
chance that any user of any drug will become addicted to it. 
To what extent a drug is addictive may be determined in a number of ways, two of the more 
common ways being by establishing how likely it is that an occasional user of a drug 
becomes a habitual user of it; and by establishing how difficult it is for the habitual user to 
quit (see for instance Jim Leitzel, Regulating Vice: Misguided Prohibitions and Realistic 
Controls, 2008, p.61). Under both methods, nicotine is considered the most addictive of 
commonly-used drugs. Marijuana is much less addictive. Alcohol, heroin, and cocaine all fall 
somewhere in between nicotine and marijuana. And some recreational drugs, such as LSD 
and other hallucinogens, are considered virtually non-addictive, if at all: as Brian Penrose 
writes, “Whatever else may be true of [hallucinogens], they’re more or less universally 
recognized as non-addictive” (Regulating Vice). 
However, even given that recreational drug users may become addicted to their drug of 
choice, and, in turn, diminish their autonomy to a greater or lesser degree, this does not 
itself render recreational drug use wrong. After all, most of us diminish our capacity to 
govern ourselves from time to time in ways that appear to be morally innocuous. Consider 
someone who is having trouble sleeping and decides to take a sleeping pill. In doing so, the 
individual chooses a course of action that will result in the diminishing of his capacity to 
govern himself. But does he thereby do something morally impermissible? It seems not. 
Of course, taking a sleeping pill involves the use of a drug. And since what is at issue here is 
the moral status of using drugs – recreationally, of course, but using drugs nonetheless – it 
might be helpful to invoke a case that does not involve the use of a drug. So consider 
enlisting in the military. Those who do so diminish their capacity to govern themselves 
rather severely – with respect to where and with whom one resides, when one goes to and 
gets out of bed, what and when one eats and drinks, whom one considers to be an enemy, 
whom one considers to be an ally, whose commands one deems authoritative and obeys, 
what one considers to be acceptable conduct, under what conditions one will kill another 
human being, and so on. Even so, it does not seem to be morally wrong to join the military 
– at least, not on the grounds that doing so diminishes one’s capacity to govern oneself. (It 
may be imprudent in some ways, of course.) This suggests that other cases involving a less-
than-extreme diminishing of one’s capacity to govern oneself are not morally wrong either. 
To be sure, the diminishing of one’s capacity to govern oneself that occurs through joining 
the military is not the result of using a drug. But again, this fact is inconsequential to the 
argument. If it is precisely the diminishing of one’s capacity to govern oneself that renders 
certain recreational drug use wrong, as is alleged here, then any activity that involves the 
diminishing of one’s capacity to govern oneself will also be wrong, regardless of the means 
by which this is achieved. 
To make this clear, suppose that what makes murder morally impermissible is that it 
involves the intentional permanent destruction of an innocent individual’s consciousness 
against their will. On this supposition, anyactivity that involves the intentional permanent 
destruction of an innocent individual’s consciousness against their will should be morally 
impermissible – including the intentional rendering of an innocent individualpermanently 
comatose against their will. The means by which the permanent destruction of the 
individual’s consciousness is achieved is different in the comatose case, of course; but it is 
the permanent destruction of the individual’s consciousness nonetheless – so rendering 
someone comatose will be wrong for the same reason that murder is wrong. Similarly, if 
diminishing one’s capacity to govern oneself is morally wrong in and of itself, then joining 
the military is thereby morally wrong. But this is implausible. 
There are many other philosophically sophisticated arguments – one which grounds the 
wrongness of recreational drug use in the claim that it blocks basic goods; another which 
grounds it in the claim that it degrades the user, and so on – but the preceding 
considerations will do for now. 
Much more can also be said about each of the arguments above, and I have done just that 
in my book A Moral Defense of Recreational Drug Use (2015). Suffice it to say that if the 
objections that I have raised against these arguments for the immorality of recreational 
drug use are cogent, then to that extent the moral case for legally prohibiting recreational 
drug use is undermined. 
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